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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DALE S. PIERRE, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
Case No. 16169 
-vs-
LAWRENCE MORRIS, as Warden 
of the Utah State Prison, 
Respondent-Appellee. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
APPELLANT HAS NOT RAISED ANY 
ISSUES WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY A REHEARING 
IN THIS MATTER. 
The authorities cited and explained in Point I 
of Respondent's Brief in opposition to rehearing in Andrews 
v. Morris with respect to the purposes for and requisite 
standards of petition for rehearing are herewith incorporated 
by reference. (pp. 3 to 9). Moreover, the application of 
that authority to the issues raised by appellants Pierre and 
Andrews in the instant matter is also incorporated as set 
forth in Respondent's brief in opposition to rehearing, at 
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pp. 3 to 9. 
Appellant Pierre raises one additional point 
in support of rehearing not discussed in the petition fqr 
rehearing in Andrews v. Morris. 
In his third point, Appellant Pierre, for the 
first time, cites Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700 (Utah 
1979) and argues that this Court 1 s opinion in the instant 
matter is inconsistant with that case. Appellant also 
argues, for the first time, that a refusal to allow a 
hearing on his complaint for a writ of habeas corpus is 
a denial of due process under the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. Appellant, however, demonstrates no affir-
mative mistake of law or fact by this Court to justify a 
rehearing. Moreover, any possible application of the 
Martinez v. Smith case to appellant 1 s case could have been 
briefed and submitted to this Court even after appellant's 
brief had been submitted since Martinez was decided months 
before this Court's decision in Pierre v. Morris. (See 
U.R.C.P. Rule 75(p) (3)). In any event, the fact that an 
opinion may be difficult to reconcile with an earlier 
opinion of the same court should not be a ground for a 
rehearing. Appellant does no more in Point III than to 
seek a second try at an appeal. Clearly, this is an im-
proper use of the rehearing procedure. 
-2-
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In summary, appellant has failed to demonstrate 
any affirmative mistake of law or fact. He presents no-
thing that has not and could not have been considered in 
the previous appeal. A rehearing should not be allowed. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT HAS PROPERLY CONSIDERED 
ALL OF APPELLANT'S CLAIMS RELATIVE TO 
THE ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
UTAH DEATH PENALTY AND SUCH CONSIDERATION 
IS FURTHERMORE CONSISTENT WITH STATE V. BROWN. 
Respondent herewith incorporates by reference 
the argument sub~itted in Point II of Respondent's Brief 
in opposition to Petition for Rehearing in Andrews v. Morris, 
case no. 16168. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT HAS ADEQUATELY CON-
SIDERED AND REJECTED APPELLANT'S CLAIM 
THAT THE ~ffiTHOD OF EXECUTION IN UTAH 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Respondent herewith incorporates by reference 
the argument submitted in Point IV of Respondent's Brief 
in opposition to Petition for Rehearing in Andrews v. Morris, 
case no. 16168 
-3-
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POINT IV 
THE COURT'S DECISIONS IN THE INSTANT 
MATTER ARE NOT IN CONFLICT WITH MARTINEZ 
V. SMITH NOR HAS APPELLANT BEEN DENIED ANY 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO A HEARING UNDER THE 
UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS. 
Appellant contends that Martinez v. Smith, 602 
P.2d 700 (1979), decided in October of last year, and 
the decision of this Court in this matter are in conflict 
and that a rehearing should be granted to deal with that 
inconsistancy. This is a new issue, raised here for the 
first time. As noted in Point I, supra, new issues and 
arguments should not be considered in a petition for 
rehearing. 
Moreover, since Hartinez was decided four months 
prior to the decision in the instant case, it is clear that 
appellant could have filed a supplemental brief alerting 
the court to new case law which he might feel relevant to 
his case, as required by U.R.C.P. Rule 75(p) (3). 
Furthermore, even if this Court should decide to 
consider this argument, respondent submits that appellant 
reads Martinez v. Smith too broadly. Both Martinez v. Smith 
and the instant opinion cited the earlier cases of Brown 
v. Turner, 21 U.2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968) and Bryant v. 
Turner, 19 U.2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967) to set forth the 
-4-
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"scope and limitations upon the use of habeas corpus after 
conviction." (Andrews at 5). In Martinez v. Smith,auera, 
the Court said: 
the writ should be available 'in 
rare cases, where it appears that there 
is a strong likelihood that there has 
been such unfairness, or failure to 
avoid due process of law, that it would 
be wholly unconscionable not to re-
examine the conviction. 
Id. at 702. 
The dismissal of petitioner Martinez' complaint for a writ 
of habeas corpus was reversed and a hearing was ordered 
because this court felt that his pleadings had raised 
sufficient questions of fact to make it unconscionable n2! 
to provide such a review. In the instant matter this 
court noted specifically that: 
No issues have been made to appear 
such that it would be wholly unconscion-
able not to re-examine. 
Pierre at 4. 
Although appellant contends that he is being 
treated unfairly because while this court considered issues 
raised in petitioner Martinez' petition and memorandum in 
support, appellant claims to have never had an opportunity 
to have submitted a memorandum in the District Court. He 
does not seek to explain why no memorandum explaining the 
legal aspects of his claim was not timely submitted with 
-5-
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his petition. Clearly, he could have done so (See U.R.C.P. 
Rule 65 B(i) (1) (3)). In fact, to allow a petitioner to 
file complaint for writ of habeas corpus containing bla~ant, 
unresearched allegations would encourage bad faith pleading 
by allowing improper delay of the imposition of sentence 
and would contradict the requirdments for post-conviction 
habeas corpus relief as explained in Andrews v. Morris, supra. 
An even more important difference between Martinez 
and the instant matter is the extent to which the two cases 
have been subjected to review. This Court noted in Pierre, 
supra at 3: 
. . . the trial court correctly 
dismissed as a matter of law since the 
Utah Statute is clearly constitutional 
'on its face' and we determined in 
Pierre that it was meticulously followed. 
Appellant had a trial and has had his trial reviewed by 
this court extensively on at least one occasion. In Martinez, 
on the other hand, petitioner had no trial due to a guilty plea 
and there had been no appeal nor any other form of review be-
fore petitioner Martinez sought a writ of habeas corpus. 
His pleadings raised issues which were determined by the 
Court to be factual, not legal, and which had never been 
considered by any court. They were serious claims 
-6-
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on effectiveness of defense counsel (an issue not ralaad 
in the instant case) and this court made it clear that 1n 
Martinez's extraordinary situation, due to extenuating 
facts, some review must have been allowed, even when to 
allow such a review by habeas corpus circumvented the 
technicalities of the law. Respondent in this appeal has 
repeatedly shown that appellant has failed to raise any 
issues which cannot be determined from the record. His 
complaint was not only insufficient as a matter of law, it 
did not, in the opinion of this Court, raise any issues 
which would require further review in the interest of 
justice. (See Pierre at 4, supra). Martinez does no more 
than require such hearings in very narrow circumstances not 
applicable here and is not inconsistant with this Court's 
action in this matter. 
Appellant claims that he is being denied due 
process under the United States and Utah Constitutions by 
the District Court's refusal to grant a hearing on his 
habeas corpus petition. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
instant matter is distinguishable from the due process 
cases cited by appellant and that appellant has not been 
denied his right to due process under the Utah and United 
States constitution. Of the cases cited by appellant in 
-7-
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support of his due process claim, all but one, Sherbert v. 
verner, 374 u.s. 398 (1963), dealt with defects in or the 
absence of bearings conducted before a State acted in some 
way to limit a significant right of a citizen. In Bell v. 
§uraon 402 u.s. 535 (1971) a provision for summary suspension 
of the driver's license of an uninsured motorist who was 
involved in an accident and failed to post security for 
possible damages was held improper when the only hearing 
did not determine if any potential for a judgment against 
the driver existed. In Slochower v. Board of Education, 
350 U.S. 551 (1956) a New York law which provided that 
any public official who invoked Fifth Amendment privileges 
would be automatically terminated was a violation of the 
due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Speizer v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), held that tax 
exemptions could not be arbitrarily denied and that the 
state must bear the burden of establishing that a taxpayer 
is not qualified. Finally, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 u.s. 254 
(1970), held that a hearing must be provided before welfare 
benefits may be terminated. The fifth case cited by appellant 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), did not discuss 
the right to a hearing but held, instead, that a person who 
cannot find work because of religious beliefs regarding 
-8-
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work on Saturday cannot be denied unemployment benefi~ 
because of a failure to find work without cause. 
All of these cases speak about the proof or 
hearing requirements necessary at the initia'tion of any 
rights deprivation. Before appellant was sentenced he 
was given the most extensive, careful and complete hearing 
available under the laws of the State of Utah. Dozens of 
potential jurors were called from which twelve were selected to 
listen to evidence for days. The State was reqUired to 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and then, in a seperate 
hearing, to show by a preponderance of the evidence that 
appellant should receive the sentence of death. Appellant's 
case was appealed to this Court which carefully reviewed 
the proceedings. The trial was also scrutinized by the 
United States Supreme Court. Respondent does not deny that 
a vital interest of appellant is at stake. However, it is 
abundantly clear that appellant has not been deprived of 
a due process hearing. Habeas corpus is an extraordinary 
remedy and due process does not require that every petitioner 
for such a writ be granted a hearing, especially in situations 
where the issues raised in the petition are shown to be legal 
in nature and thus subject to a motion to dismiss as a matter 
of law. To so hold would render the regular appellate 
-9-
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process a nullity. This Court should deny appellant's 
request for a re-hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the recent decision by 
this Court in Pierre v. Morris, No. 16169, filed Feb. 13, 
1980, was correct and that a rehearing is not merited. 
Responden~ prays that the present petition for rehearing 
be denied. 
-10-
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
--
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